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As noted by Kim (2006), “emergence” is a philosophical term of art. There is no
unique or unified theory of emergence, and the meaning of the term varies from
author to author. Many scientists with a philosophical bent love the term, as do
some philosophers. But others complain that “emergence” is too vague and
unhelpful. Despite this, there is a common set of features that many concepts of
emergence share. Philosophers and scientists use the term “emergence” in relation
to levels of reality. The picture often invoked is that of a layer cake: physics at the
bottom, followed by chemistry, biology, psychology, etc., where each level is seen
as harbouring novel entities,1 properties, phenomena, which emerge from the
interactions at the lower level.2 This picture may be problematic, but if one accepts
it, emergence is seen like a nice way to explain the relations between the levels.
When thinking about emergence in this way, two seemingly contradictory
features become apparent. On the one hand, the emergents (be they entities,
properties, phenomena, processes, laws, explanations, etc.) are seen as dependent
on the lower level; on the other hand, emergents are seen as being autonomous from
the lower level. These two features seem contradictory: how can one and the same
set of things, properties, etc. be at the same time dependent and autonomous from
another set of things, properties, etc.? I suspect this is one of the reasons
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why emergence is sometimes seen as an incoherent position. But perhaps it need not
be; perhaps there is a sense in which dependence and autonomy can coexist.
A challenge that emergentists face, therefore, is to explain precisely how this can
be. One way to do this is to conceive of dependence in terms of supervenience, and
of autonomy in terms of the failure of reduction.3 Thus, emergence can be seen as a
version of nonreductive physicalism: physicalism because virtually all approaches
to emergence recognize that at the basis, all there is is physical – the higher strata
are seen as supervening on the physical; nonreductive because, for one reason or
another, the higher levels do not reduce to the lower level.
Some authors go beyond this picture and see emergence as depending on
downward causation (Hendry 2006). Others do not consider downward causation
as a necessary condition for emergence (Batterman 2002). In this paper I will
assume a fairly liberal concept of emergence – arguably, a theory which does not
include downward causation can still be a theory of emergence if it talks about
levels of reality which are dependent but autonomous from one another.
Developing theories of emergence can be useful to those who are concerned with
the disciplinary autonomy of the special sciences. Since the emergents at one level
are autonomous in relation to the lower level, it is natural to think that the science
studying them is autonomous from the science studying the lower level. The
autonomy of chemistry from physics continues to be debated. Some authors have
attempted to ground the autonomy of chemistry in a philosophical position called
internal realism (Lombardi and Labarca 2005). But others have argued that chem-
istry cannot be autonomous from physics if it reduces to it (Manafu 2013b). Thus,
insofar as some kind of failure of reduction seems to be a central ingredient of
emergence, emergence could perhaps account for the autonomy of chemistry.
Of course, whether chemistry is autonomous from physics depends on how one
conceives of autonomy. Unfortunately, the notion of disciplinary autonomy has not
been analyzed sufficiently in the philosophy of science. Many philosophers of
science rely on an intuitive and implicit notion of autonomy.4 One can distinguish
between several types of autonomy. First, one can talk about historical autonomy.
Historically, chemistry has been independent from physics. It has been claimed that
chemistry had become a science “of great extent and certainty” long before we had
any mechanistic insight into the internal make-up of the elements (Broad 1925).
Broad argued that for a long time, progress in chemistry was possible without using
3A set of properties H supervenes on a set of properties L if and only if (i) any two objects x and y
that have the same L properties will necessarily have the same H properties (though not necessarily
viceversa), and (ii) any two objects z and w that differ in their H properties will also differ in their
L properties (though not necessarily viceversa).
4 Hendry (2012) is an exception, but he does not give many details. He writes: “A science is
autonomous if its laws and explanations make no appeal to the laws or categories of other
sciences.” (Hendry 2012, p. 382).
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any mechanistic assumptions. He concluded that the possibility of mechanistic
explanation is not essential to the progress of chemistry.
If then chemistry can be a scientific subject and can make steady progress without using the
assumption that a mechanistic explanation of chemical phenomena is possible, it would
presumably have made precisely the same progress if in fact no such explanation had been
possible. (Broad 1925, p. 74)
While Broad is correct to point out that progress in chemistry happened long
before modern mechanistic explanations of chemical phenomena became available,
it is also true that the mechanistic insights that became available in the twentieth
century have allowed for a great expansion of our chemical knowledge. They
allowed us to better understand the chemical reactions that we knew about, and to
design new reactions. They allowed us to synthesize new molecules, and even new
elements, and to design and create new drugs and materials. In other words,
chemistry would not have made precisely the same progress if quantum mechanics
had not been discovered, although for a long time its own progress was independent
from the progress of physics. Therefore, the autonomy of chemistry in relation to
physics cannot be based solely on the notion of historical autonomy, which is also
only partially defensible.
A second type of autonomy is methodological autonomy. In general, a chem-
istry lab looks very different from a physics lab and what goes on in a chemistry
lab is different from what goes on in a physics lab. But one may respond to this by
saying that while physics and chemistry differ with regard to their methodologies
in general, the methods of some branches of chemistry are in fact physical in
nature. For example, the bond length and angles of molecules are determined
using various types of spectroscopy. Spectroscopy is used in physical and analyt-
ical chemistry to identify the composition of substances or to assess the concen-
tration of a given chemical species; computational methods that make use of
quantum mechanics are used to determine the structure of compounds. Although
in general the methods of chemistry and physics are quite different, this does not
demonstrate that chemistry is autonomous from physics. This is because the
entities and properties that form the subject matter of chemistry could still be
physical entities or properties, even if they are studied with non-physical (i.e.,
chemical) methods. Thus, what philosophers have in mind when they talk about
the autonomy of chemistry in relation to physics is not captured solely by
historical or methodological autonomy.
A stronger notion of autonomy can be discussed – the so-called ontological
autonomy of chemistry. Indeed, this stronger notion of autonomy is the one which
presents the most philosophical interest. But what does it amount to? I make the
following proposal: a discipline is ontologically autonomous from another if the
ontology of the first is distinct from the ontology of the second. To be informative,
this proposal must specify what it is meant by “ontology”. Luckily, we have a
pretty decent understanding of what an ontology is. Arguably, an ontology must
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include: entities, processes, phenomena, properties, laws. To this list one may add
explanations, if they are viewed ontically, not just epistemically.5 If all these turn
out to be physical entities, properties, etc. in disguise, then it is pretty clear that
chemistry cannot be autonomous from physics. For chemistry to be ontologically
autonomous from physics, chemistry must talk about its own entities, processes,
properties, laws. These must be sui generis. In other words, they must be chemical
properties, laws, etc. in their own right, not just species of physical properties,
laws, etc.
The ontological autonomy of chemistry is tied with the failure of (at least some
versions of) reductionism. Indeed, if all chemical laws are obtainable from
quantum-mechanical laws, then how could the belief in the autonomy of this
discipline be maintained? Since emergence makes possible the existence of sui
generis chemical properties, laws, and explanations, it is natural to think that
emergence can justify the ontological autonomy of chemistry.
Here is the plan of this paper. The next section summarizes the current state of
the debate regarding ontological emergence in chemistry. The current approaches
to ontological emergence in chemistry have been met with scepticism, and some
have argued that the appropriate attitude regarding ontological emergence in
chemistry is agnosticism (Scerri 2012). In the third section I offer a novel approach
to emergence in chemistry; the approach is in some sense weaker than the existing
approaches, but I argue that it can justify the ontological autonomy of chemistry. In
the fourth section I discuss a couple of objections to this approach and speculate a
bit on what it entails about the nature of chemistry as a science and about the
appropriate model of the relationship between the special sciences. The concluding
section summarizes the main points.
4.2 The Present State of the Debate About Emergence
in Chemistry
There are several contemporary approaches to emergence which are applicable to
chemistry, including Humphreys (1996, 1997a, b), Luisi (2002), Hendry (2003,
2006, 2010a, b), Llored (2012).6 In this section I will focus only on some accounts
which claim to be ontological (as opposed to merely epistemic) and which apply
explicitly to chemistry. More precisely, I will be focusing on the account of
emergence recently defended by Hendry.
5 An ontology includes objects, phenomena, as well as relations between them. If one includes
explanations, then they could be regarded as objective relations between laws and phenomena. The
idea that explanations could be seen ontically does not sound as implausible if one thinks that it
makes sense to say that for a certain phenomenon an explanation exists but it may never be found.
6 For a comprehensive review see Manafu (2013a).
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To understand the present state of the debate it is useful to start with Broad, for
whom chemistry “seems to offer the most plausible example of emergent behav-
iour” (Broad 1925, p. 65). It is useful to do so because Hendry’s account is relying
on Broad’s. Broad uses an older distinction made by Mill (1882) between purely
mechanical behaviour and chemical behaviour. For Broad, a system is emergent if
its properties cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the properties of its
constituents taken separately or in other wholes, including knowledge of their
inter-relations. According to Broad, the only way to learn about the chemical
properties of a chemical compound is empirically, by studying samples of that
compound. If we start with knowledge of the components and the relations between
the components and we try to determine the properties of the compound, then – if
chemical compounds are truly emergent – we are bound to fail. Our failure is not
due to some mysterious chemical spirits similar to the e´lan vital in biology; for
Broad, the natural kinds that are the subject matter of chemistry are wholly
composed of the kinds that are the subject matter of physics. Nor is it necessarily
due to the lack of precise knowledge of the initial conditions or computational
power. Rather, the problem is more fundamental – the “unique and ultimate”
character of the laws of chemistry (Broad 1925, p. 65). Such laws, which connect
the properties of chemical compounds with the properties of their components are
called by Broad trans-ordinal laws. According to Broad, our failure is due either to
(i) the existence of innumerable “latent” properties in each element, each of which
is manifested only in certain conditions, or (ii) to the lack of any general principle of
composition, such as the parallelogram law in dynamics, by which the behaviour of
any chemical compound could be deduced from its structure and from the behav-
iour of each of its elements in isolation (Broad 1925, pp. 66–67).
McLaughlin interpreted Broad (or more generally British emergentism) as
holding the view that an emergent whole possesses force-generating properties of
a sort not possessed by any of its parts (McLaughlin 2008, p. 41). On this view,
when particles are arranged in certain select configurations, new, unanticipated
forces arise. McLaughlin called these forces configurational.7 In chemistry, con-
figurational forces are supposed to be sui generis chemical forces characterizing the
compounds, irreducible to physical forces characterizing the components. They are
supposed to be capable of downward causation – the ability to influence the basal
conditions from which they arise (i.e., the underlying dynamics). It is perhaps
natural to think that on Broad’s view these forces may be responsible for the failure
of compositionality and the emergent behaviour of chemicals, including chemical
affinity. McLaughlin contrasted configurational forces with resultant forces, i.e.,
non-emergent forces which are generated by other forces, not by configurations of
particles. “Emergence”, therefore, has been contrasted with “resultance”.
7 Although Broad does not use this term, McLaughlin (2008) interprets Broad in this way.
According to McLaughlin, “it is clear that he [i.e., Broad] maintains that certain structures of
chemical compounds can influence motion in fundamental ways” (McLaughlin 2008, p. 47).
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McLaughlin finds the kind of emergentism espoused by Broad “enormously
implausible”. According to McLaughlin, the fall of British emergentism was not
caused by some philosophical difficulties, but by advances in science:
[Q]uantum mechanical explanations of chemical bonding in terms of the electro-magnetic
force [. . .] render the doctrines of configurational chemical [. . .] forces enormously
implausible. (McLaughlin 2008, p. 49)
McLaughlin’s view has been widely embraced by philosophers. It would not be
too exaggerated to say that it has become the orthodoxy amongst contemporary
philosophers. But this orthodoxy has been challenged by Scerri (2012) who
questioned the idea that progresses in theoretical physical chemistry have dealt a
death blow to Broadian emergence. Scerri argues that today’s theories of bonding still
do not allow us to predict in advance the properties of compounds based on the
properties of the components. Indeed, in all but the simplest cases, the theoretical and
computational difficulties are enormous. But Scerri does not believe that this warrants
one to draw the conclusion that emergence as conceived by Broad is a genuine
phenomenon. Rather, Scerri distinguishes between what he calls “apparent emer-
gence” (i.e., epistemic emergence, which might occur because of the limitations of
our current theories) and “ontological emergence” (i.e., a deeper kind of emergence,
which might occur because of the reasons presented by Broad). It is not hard to argue
that chemistry does exhibit some sort of epistemic emergence, but according to Scerri
it is an open question whether it exhibits ontological emergence as well.
Broad’s account of emergence has inspired a prominent contemporary account
of ontological emergence in chemistry, due to Hendry (2003, 2006, 2010a, b, 2012).
Instead of employing configurational forces, Hendry employs “configurational
Hamiltonians” – non-resultant Hamiltonians governing the behaviour of the
molecule. Hendry gives as an example the CO2 molecule. One can view the parts
of this molecule as quantum mechanical harmonic oscillators and rigid rotators. But
one can do this only after one assumes the linear structure of CO2. Where does this
assumed molecular structure come from? Hendry argues that rather than deriving
this structure using resultant Hamiltonians, the linear structure of CO2 is put in “by
hand”. For Hendry, this is tantamount to assuming “configurational Hamiltonians”.
Since the overall molecular structure constrains the motions of the parts of the
molecule, this would count as an example of downward causation.
Now, the reductionist may agree that the molecule as a whole constrains the
motion of its parts. But he may still disagree that this is a genuine case of downward
causation; the reductionist may say that the powers of the molecule to constrain the
motion of its parts come ultimately from the parts themselves, and their inter-
relations. We use the configurational Hamiltonians, the reductionist may argue, just
because the real (resultant) Hamiltonians are just too hard to obtain. Thus, the
configurational Hamiltonians are just approximations to the real (resultant) Ham-
iltonians, and their adoption does not make much of a difference. But Hendry
argues this answer won’t work. Hendry starts by pointing out that in the calculation
of the wavefunction of the molecule one makes use of the Born-Oppenheimer
approximation, which allows the molecular wavefunction to be broken into its
electronic and nuclear components, and in which the nuclei are considered
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“clamped”. But following Woolley and Sutcliffe (1977), Hendry argues that in the
process of applying the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, the symmetry proper-
ties of the molecular wavefunction are removed (Hendry 2010a, b). The idea here is
that quantum mechanics cannot recover the structure (and the lower symmetry) of
real molecules. For example, in the case of isomers, quantum mechanics cannot
distinguish between two different molecules, for it assigns the same wavefunction
to two distinct molecular structures – a wavefunction which is in fact a superposi-
tion of the wavefunctions corresponding to the two definite molecular structures
(and has thus a higher symmetry). Hendry suggests that just as the measurement
problem in quantum mechanics cannot be solved by a “superposition approxima-
tion” (i.e., simply discarding the part of the wavefunction that does not correspond
to what is observed), it is just as much a mistake to invoke the Born-Oppenheimer
approximation to argue that the structure of molecules is determined by resultant,
albeit hard to obtain Hamiltonians.
In reply to Hendry’s arguments, Scerri (2012) has pointed out that the lower
symmetry of the molecules can be accounted for by their quantum-mechanical
interaction with the environment (decoherence). Molecules are never in isolation;
they are always surrounded by other molecules, to which they interact. Conse-
quently, the wavefunction of a given molecule will not be for a long time in a
superposition of states corresponding to two different molecular structures. The
idea here is that pretty fast, the superposition will collapse and the molecule will
assume the observed structure. Scerri claims that “taking account of quantum
decoherence allows one to tame the effect of entanglement and appears to alleviate
the concern that ontological entities such as molecules with particular structures
might not exist in their own right” (Scerri 2012, p. 20).
The appeal to decoherence is an interesting move, but it is not without its
problems. First, it should be mentioned that decoherence does not solve the problem
of definite outcomes, which together with the problem of the preferred basis forms
the so-called measurement problem in the foundations of quantum mechanics
(Adler 2003; Zeh 2003). Decoherence just passes the entanglement on to the
environment. In fact, decoherence exacerbates the measurement problem. Scerri
recognizes that decoherence does not allow one to predict any particular outcomes.
But he claims that this concern can be addressed by assuming that the collapse is
ubiquitous, and it happens even in the absence of observers. He claims that this
intuition is supported by the fact that the classical world is populated by definite
outcomes (i.e., definite outcomes are not just an effect of conscious observers). But
these remarks essentially amount to taking a stand on the interpretation of quantum
mechanics; of course, they do not by themselves amount to an interpretation of
quantum mechanics, but they favour a set of interpretations over others. So it looks
like that the debate about configurational Hamiltonians and molecular structure has
become entangled with the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics. Thus, it
seems that to elucidate the hard problem of emergence in chemistry one needs to
elucidate a perhaps even harder problem. Since there is the risk that this debate
could degenerate into a debate about the proper interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics or even turn into a stalemate, perhaps it is worth considering a different
approach to emergence in chemistry.
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Insofar as Hendry’s theory of emergence focuses on entities, it is at odds not only
with reductionism, but also with the causal closure or completeness of physics – the
thesis that “all physical events are determined (or have their chances determined)
entirely by prior physical events according to physical laws” (Papineau 1990,
p. 67). This is because on Hendry’s view, molecules are capable of downward
causation. So if the theory of emergence advocated by Hendry is true, the set of
physical causes must be supplemented with sui generis chemical causes – mole-
cules exerting downward causation on their parts.
The rejection of the causal closure of physics entailed by the kind of ontological
emergence advocated by Broad and Hendry may be problematic. Some philoso-
phers argued that the causal closure of physics is supported by inductive arguments
based on the history of science (Papineau 2002, see Appendix) or on conservation
laws (Vicente 2006).8 One worry is that in a world in which all basic forces are
physical and the conservation of energy is respected, sui generis non-physical
forces (whatever this might mean) of the kind required to break the causal closure
of physics could not arise. Maybe this objection can be responded to, and maybe the
causal closure of physics is just another philosophical preconception of the
naturalistic-minded philosopher. Or maybe not. Regardless, it seems to me that it
would be preferable if the ontological autonomy of chemistry did not depend on a
theory of emergence which is committed to the falsity of the causal closure of
physics. This is another reason why it may be fruitful to approach emergence in
chemistry differently.
Scerri’s view on the current state of affairs regarding emergence in chemistry is
that just as McLaughlin has failed to rule out emergence and downward causation,
so Hendry has failed to make a case in their favour. Scerri believes that the proper
attitude to adopt towards emergence and downward causation in chemistry is
agnosticism. Given the points I made earlier (about how the debate over the kind
of emergence defended by Hendry might require one to take a stand on the
interpretation of quantum mechanics, and about how the rejection of the causal
closure of physics that it entails might be at odds with the principle of the
conservation of energy), but also given what is at stake (namely the disciplinary
autonomy of chemistry), I think it is worth investigating alternate routes to emer-
gence. The rest of this paper sketches such a proposal.
4.3 A Novel Approach: Functional Emergence
Before sketching the contours of a new approach to emergence in chemistry it
would be useful to state why such an account is desirable and what we want from
it. As mentioned in the introduction, developing accounts of emergence in chem-
istry is important because emergence can help us defend the ontological autonomy
8 For a different view, see Gibb (2010).
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of chemistry. The question that I think needs to be taken seriously is this: if the
entities that chemistry talks about are composed of nothing but the entities that
quantum mechanics talks about, why do we have chemistry and not just applied
quantum mechanics? Are there any good reasons for upholding the ontological
autonomy of chemistry, as opposed to just a merely epistemic, methodological or
historical autonomy? If the kind of stuff chemistry talks about consists of the kind of
stuff that quantum mechanics talks about, what justifies belief in chemical properties,
or that in chemical laws or explanations? Are there even chemical properties, laws,
and explanations, as opposed to just complex quantum-mechanical properties, laws,
and explanations? Does chemistry latch onto genuine features of the world, which
inhabit a distinct ontological level? Or rather the chemical properties and laws are
just useful instruments for predicting and explaining, but ultimately with no claim to
the fundamental truths about nature, which remain microphysical? If chemistry
is emergent, then these questions may find satisfactory answers. If one can show
that there really are chemical entities, properties, laws and explanations, then the
ontological autonomy of chemistry can be secured.
So far, the philosophical efforts towards a theory of ontological emergence in
chemistry focused on the emergence of entities. For Broad, what was emergent was
chemical compounds; for Hendry, what is emergent is molecules (molecular struc-
ture). But an ontology contains more than just entities; it also contains processes,
properties, phenomena, laws, and on some understandings of ontology, even expla-
nations. All these are just as legitimate elements of an ontology as entities. The
approach I am proposing focuses not on entities, but on properties and laws, which
can be used in sui generis chemical explanations. It starts from the observation that
many chemical properties are defined not in terms of their constitutive microphys-
ical structure, but functionally, in terms of their efficient roles. In particular, many
chemical properties are defined by their behaviour in relation to other chemical
properties, in the context of chemical reactions. The idea that a thing is defined by
what it does and not by what it consists of was first advocated by Alan Turing, in the
foundations of computer science and artificial intelligence (Turing 1950). Turing
thought about it via an analogy with the mathematical concept of a function (1950,
p. 439). Turing’s idea was quickly adopted in the philosophy of mind, where it
served as a basis for an alternative theory of mind, different from both the identity
theory and behaviourism (Putnam 1975a, b; Fodor 1974). The theses of function-
alism and multiple realizability have also inspired anti-reductionist arguments in
the philosophy of biology (Kitcher 1984, 1999; Kincaid 1990). But chemistry is,
I believe, the ideal domain where this sort of anti-reductionist argument can be
made. The fact that chemical properties can be intersubjectively scrutinized, that
they are amenable to measurement, experiment and to a quantitative understanding
to a greater extent than those in the other special sciences makes chemistry one of
the best case studies (see also Scerri and McIntyre 1997, p. 227; Humphreys
1997b). Chemistry is the discipline that is in some sense closest to physics, and
therefore it is the first domain outside physics itself where we can observe func-
tional properties and irreducibility/emergence, if these truly exist.
The approach to emergence I’m proposing starts from the observation that many
chemical properties are defined not in terms of their constitutive microphysical
structure, but functionally, in terms of their efficient roles. So far, philosophers of
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chemistry have not given appropriate consideration to this idea. For example, the
volume which was published as a result of the 3rd Erlenmeyer Colloquy for the
Philosophy of Chemistry, titled “The Autonomy of Chemistry” does not even
mention chemical functional properties, despite the broad consensus and shared
anti-reductionist attitudes among the participants (Janich and Psarros 1998). In fact,
the idea of multiple realizability (which is often associated with functionalism) has
been regarded with distrust in the philosophy of chemistry, being labelled as
“wishful thinking” (Scerri 2000). Yet, multiply realizable properties feature prom-
inently in the discussions about the limits of reductionism in philosophy of mind,
philosophy of biology, and philosophy of physics (Batterman 2000, 2002). I think
chemistry makes no exception; on the contrary, I think chemistry provides us with
some of the best examples of functional, multiply realized properties.
Consider the property of being an acid. On the Arrhenius definition, acids are
defined as those substances which, when dissolved in water, increase the concen-
tration of hydrogen ions in the solution. On the Brønsted-Lowry definition, an acid
is any compound that can donate one or more protons to other chemical species in
chemical reactions. And on the Lewis definition, acids are those compounds that
accept a pair of electrons from another compound in a chemical reaction. All these
definitions are functional, i.e., they pick out acids not by referring to their micro-
physical structure, but by referring to their behaviour in relation to other chemical
substances. Compare the property of being an acid with the property of being an
alcohol. Alcohols are those molecules that have a hydroxyl group bound to a
saturated carbon atom. This microstructural commonality can be invoked when
explaining the chemical properties of alcohols. In a certain sense of the term
“reduction”, the property of being an alcohol reduces (i.e., is identical) to the
property of being a microphysical system containing a hydroxyl group bound to a
saturated carbon – all alcohols and only alcohols have this microstructural property.
But the property of being an acid (or, more accurately, acidity in general) does not
“reduce” in a similar manner to any given microstructural property. Of course, one
may accept that any given instance of an acid (or acidic behaviour) is identical with
a given instance of a physical property or process – token reductionism may hold.
But acidity as such (as a property type) cannot be identified to any given micro-
structural property – type reductionism fails. Acidity is first and foremost a behav-
iour, which can be realized by many systems of electrons and nuclei. In
philosophical lingo, the property of being an acid is said to be multiply realized.
Because of this, it is not discernible at the lower level as a microstructural property.
It “emerges” out of the microphysics, and becomes visible only in the context of a
chemical reaction, as a pattern of chemical behaviour.
Acidity may not be the only functional property in chemistry: arguably, the
property of being a base, a reductant, an oxidant may also be functional. To these,
one may add the property of being a metal. More than 70 % of existing chemical
elements are metals; at standard conditions of temperature and pressure, 91 ele-
ments out of 117 are considered metals. Twelve out of 18 groups in the periodic
table are occupied exclusively by metals – alkali elements, alkaline earth elements,
lanthanides, actinides, and the transition elements, are all metals. Some elements in
group 13 to group 16 are metals too. As one can expect, the microstructural
description for all these atoms will look disunified. Finding a microstructural
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feature that is shared by all metal atoms and only by them is highly implausible.
Despite the fact that their microstructural descriptions are wildly heterogeneous,
metals have interesting chemical properties in common: their atoms readily lose
electrons to form positive ions; they form metallic bonds with other metal atoms
and ionic bonds with nonmetal atoms. Since the property of being a metal is not
characterized by a shared microstructure, but by what the entities instantiating the
property can do, this property is also functional.
Functional properties in chemistry are not only multiply realized (in the sense of
there being many systems composed of electrons and nuclei that can carry out the
specified role), but they are also multiply realizable – the list of systems composed
of electrons and nuclei that can carry out the specified role is open ended. Chemistry
is in the business of synthesising new substances. Although synthetic elements have
also been created, most of the synthetic substances are compounds. For any
functionally defined chemical property like acidity, chemists can come up with
new compounds which can carry out that behaviour.
If there are functional, multiply realizable properties in chemistry, then this means
that certain notions of reductionism cannot be maintained. I have already mentioned
type reductionism. Type reductionism (or, as Fodor called it, “type physicalism”) is
the idea that every property mentioned in the laws of any science is a physical
property. If type reductionism were true, there would be a one-to-one correspondence
between chemical properties and microstructural properties. The kinds that chemistry
talks about would be shown to be identical to, or at least coextensive with, physical
kinds. For some chemical properties (like the property of being an alcohol) this is in
fact true – as stated, there is a one-to-one correspondence between alcohols and
microphysical systems containing a hydroxyl group bound to a saturated carbon
atom. But for other chemical properties (like the property of being an acid) it is
not. This suggests that properties like acidity are not physical properties in disguise;
they are sui generis chemical properties, i.e., chemical properties in their own right.
Acidity is made possible by physical processes at the lower level, and any instance of
acidic behaviour (i.e., any particular reaction) may be identical to (or coextensive
with) a specific physical process at the lower level. But acidity as a property type is
not identical to (or coextensive with) any microstructural physical property. It
emerges as a property only when one zooms out of microphysics and starts looking
not at microphysical structures, but at their behaviours.
The existence of functional properties in chemistry also impacts reductionism
about chemical laws. On Nagel’s concept of reduction (1961), chemistry would
reduce to physics if one could derive all the laws of chemistry from the laws of
physics together with bridge laws connecting the terms in the vocabularies of the
two sciences.9 The philosophical literature on Nagelian reduction has long debated
9 In this context, by “chemical laws” I do not mean exceptionless and timeless universal truths, of
the kind that occur in fundamental physics (or maybe not even there). Rather, I mean the kind of
regularities chemists use on a daily basis, and which chemistry students find circled in chemistry
textbooks. For example, the statement that “Acids in reaction with metals generate hydrogen gas”
would count as a chemical law. If one does not accept this charitable reading of what a law should
mean, then the Nagelian reduction of chemistry to physics cannot even begin to be discussed.
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the implications of multiple realizability for bridge laws. If one conceives of bridge
laws as a posteriori identity statements, then bridge laws must be biconditionals
linking kinds. That is, they must connect a chemical kind with exactly one micro-
physical kind.10 Multiple realizability prevents this one-to-one connection.11 But
even if the reductionist retreats to a one-to-many connection between a chemical
property and a heterogeneous set of physical properties, it is still unclear that the
desiderata of Nagelian reduction can be met. As mentioned, the reduction of
chemistry requires the derivation of chemical laws from physical laws. But it is
questionable that the relationship between the physical realizers of the functional
properties which figure in some chemical laws would have any nomic character.
Consider the chemical law that acids in reaction with metals generate a metal salt
and hydrogen. The number of compounds rendering this chemical law true is vast.
Take the following two examples (in aqueous solution):
H2SO4 þ Fe! FeSO4 þ H2
2HClþ Zn! ZnCl2 þ H2
Now, to paraphrase Fodor (1974), one may say that while it is a law that sulfuric
acid in reaction with iron produces iron sulfate and hydrogen, and it is a law that
hydrogen chloride in reaction with zinc produces zinc dichloride and hydrogen, it is
not a law that either sulfuric acid or hydrogen chloride in reaction with either iron or
zinc produces either iron sulfate and hydrogen, or zinc dichloride and hydrogen.
This last statement is too gerrymandered to have any nomic character. Nonetheless,
the more general claim, asserting that acids in reactions with metals produce a metal
salt and hydrogen, is a law. Even if the two statements above expressing the
reactions can be construed as stating laws of physics (which is in itself problem-
atic), one could not use them to deduce the chemical law that acids in reaction with
metals generate a metal salt and hydrogen. Since the nomic character of this
statement (and of similar statements relating functional properties) cannot be
recovered from the reduction base, such statements – if laws at all – must be
regarded as sui generis chemical laws.
The functional, multiply realizable chemical properties may occur in higher
level chemical explanations. Q: “Why did the marble antefixes on the roof the
Philadelphia Merchants’ Exchange lose their detail?” A: “Because of the acid rain.”
I take it that this is a perfectly satisfactory explanation. The answer successfully
selects one of the contrast classes (chemical) and eliminates the others (mechanical,
temperature variations, etc.). Admittedly, the explanation is not specific; it does not
mention the precise composition of the acid rain, and it leaves out the specific
chemical reactions. But this is not necessarily a defect of the explanation; in fact, it
10 I am assuming a strong connection between kinds and properties.
11 Of course, one may reply by saying that bridge laws need not be biconditionals. But there are
many problems with this move, and this is not the place to discuss them. I will just mention Fodor
who writes that if the relation in the bridge law “is interpreted as any relation other than identity, the
truth of reductivism will only guaranty the truth of a weak version of physicalism” (1974, p. 99).
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can be a virtue. By not going into the details, the explanation is unified: it sees
various compounds as instances of a single kind of substance, namely acid. Since
the explanation is insensitive to the particular compounds responsible for the acidic
properties of the rain, it is robust: it remains valid despite variations in the
composition of the acid rain that may occur from year to year. Also, the explanation
has a broad explanatory range: it can account for the loss of detail in the marble
antefixes on buildings situated in different geographical locations, where the acid
rain has a different chemical composition. Since it features a sui generis chemical
property, the explanation above may be called a sui generis chemical explanation.
In contrast with the explanations mentioning the particular reactions (which per-
haps could be seen by a ruthless reductionist as physical explanations), the expla-
nation invoking the acidity of the rain is robust, unified, and has a broad explanatory
range. But this happens only because it is a higher level explanation, i.e., an
explanation which employs a higher level concept.
If chemical properties, laws and explanations are not identical or coextensive
with physical properties, laws and explanations, then they should be treated as sui
generis. The existence of sui generis chemical properties, laws and explanations
supports the idea that chemistry is ontologically autonomous from physics, which is
one of the two defining characteristics of emergence. The other characteristic of
emergence, namely dependence, is also satisfied by the account I’m proposing. The
functional chemical properties like acidity are made possible by the physical
processes involving systems of electrons and nuclei. The kind of emergence I’m
proposing has no problems embracing supervenience physicalism – the idea that
any physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate of our world simpliciter. I take the
following to be true: (i) if the microphysical level were to disappear, the chemical
level would disappear as well; (ii) any change at the chemical level must involve a
change at the microphysical level; (iii) any microphysical duplicate of our world
will be a chemical duplicate.
Since the view I’m proposing meets both characteristics of emergence, and is
made possible by the existence of functional properties, I will call it functional
emergence. The use of the term “emergence” is appropriate because the existence
of functional properties in chemistry supports the layered view of the world
characteristic of emergentism. The sui generis chemical properties, laws and
explanations function at a higher level than the physical properties, laws and
explanations; they depend on the physical level, but they do not reduce to it.
I take it that supervenience physicalism is an uncontroversial thesis, which can
be shared by reductionists and emergentists alike. But, as mentioned earlier, not all
versions of emergence share a deeper physicalist commitment, namely the com-
pleteness of physics. For example, those versions of emergence which are commit-
ted to the emergence of entities (e.g., Broad’s or Hendry’s) will conflict with the
thesis that all physical events are determined (or have their chances determined)
entirely by prior physical events according to physical laws. For if there are sui
generis chemical entities which are capable of causing physical events (via down-
ward or horizontal causation) then the causes of those events won’t be strictly
speaking physical; they will be chemical. But functional emergence does not take
this step. On the view that I’m proposing, entities may be wholly resultant.
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Functional emergence need not be committed to the emergence of entities, or to
their ability to exert downward causation; it is committed solely to the emergence of
properties, laws, and explanations. As a result, there need not be any conflict with
the completeness of physics; functional emergence and the completeness of physics
can peacefully coexist.
4.4 Two Objections
There are several problems with the view that I’m sketching, but I will only discuss
two of them. First, one may object to calling the account of emergence I’m
proposing ontological. Since on this account entities do not count as emergent,
why claim that functional emergence is a kind of ontological emergence? After all,
if all chemical entities are composed of nothing else except microphysical entities,
doesn’t this mean that the ontology of chemistry reduces to, or is a subset of, the
ontology of physics?
The problem with the argument above is that it construes ontology in a restricted
way, as referring exclusively to entities (i.e., individuals). Ontology is concerned
not only with entities, but also with properties, laws, and on some accounts,
explanations. If one distinguishes between a property and its instances, as one
should, the fact that every instance of a chemical property is composed of nothing
else except instances of microphysical properties does not mean that all chemical
properties are in fact microphysical properties in disguise.12 Similarly, it would be a
mistake to think that if all events are governed by physical laws, then all laws must
be physical. Although the entities that chemistry talks about may be composed of
nothing else except microphysical entities, this leaves open the possibility of sui
generis chemical properties and laws. But if that is the case, there is a sense in
which one can still talk about the ontological autonomy of chemistry. This result
contrasts with the view advocated by McIntyre, who argued that the ontological
interpretation of the concept of emergence should nearly always be eschewed in
favour of an epistemological interpretation (McIntyre 2007).
It must be admitted, however, that this ontological autonomy is not radical: if the
entities that microphysics talks about were to vanish, there would be nothing left;
consequently, there would be no chemical properties, no laws relating these prop-
erties, and no explanations employing those laws and properties; although the
ontology of chemistry is autonomous from the ontology of physics, it relies upon it.
The second problem is that not all chemical properties are defined functionally.
What does this situation tell us with respect to the nature of chemistry as a science,
and its autonomy from physics? In my view, this situation reflects the status of
chemistry as “the first” of the special sciences. Some chemical properties (like the
property of being an alcohol) can be reductively identified with microphysical
12 For the distinction between a property and its instances see Swoyer and Orilia (2011).
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properties. But others (like being an acid), are defined functionally, and they will
not be reducible to any particular physical properties. This depicts an image of
chemistry as a “mixed” science – a science that is close enough to physics so that
some of the properties it talks about are microphysical properties, but also a science
that begins to emancipate itself from the base, and deals with genuinely new
properties. The “mixed” character of chemistry qualifies the thesis that chemistry
is ontologically autonomous from physics, and perhaps it weakens it to some extent.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the mixed character of chemistry
makes the ontology of this discipline as a whole a sub-domain of the ontology of
physics. Since the sui generis properties and regularities that chemistry talks about
are sufficiently numerous and pervasive, the ontological autonomy of chemistry can
be preserved.
This image of chemistry as a “mixed science” offers only a partial support to the
classical layer cake model of science that has been assumed by many reductionists,
anti-reductionists and emergentists alike. The chemical properties and regularities
are always susceptible of disruptions “from below”. In other words, chemical
properties and regularities can always be affected by physical or microphysical
factors. A clear example is the influence of temperature on chemical reactions, but
numerous other examples could be found. Physical factors such as electromagnetic
fields, pressure, even gravity may interfere with chemical properties and laws, no
matter how sui generis these are. Thus, although chemistry has its own ontology
which is distinct from that of physics, is not “insulated” from physics. To express
this in the terms of the layer cake metaphor, chemistry is not a perfectly distinct
layer that lays flat on top of the physical layer. Instead of the layer cake model,
perhaps a better model could be suggested, one which captures more accurately the
relationships between the various sciences. For the lack of a better metaphor, this
could be called the “Easter bread” model. In the “Easter bread” model, the sciences
are not arranged neatly in distinct layers, with physics at the base and then followed
by chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.; rather, they interweave and penetrate each
other globally, although locally they typically retain their distinctness.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper I attempted to outline a novel approach to emergence in chemistry.
The motivation for this was twofold: on the one hand, emergence is a way to secure
the ontological autonomy of chemistry from physics; on the other, the most
prominent approaches to ontological emergence in chemistry have been met with
scepticism. The account I proposed differs from the most prominent existing
accounts in several ways. What is emergent on my account is not entities, but
properties, laws and explanations. Although the account I’m proposing may be new
to chemistry, it is not new to philosophy (though the phrase “functional emergence”
as I used it here may be). Functional properties which are multiply realizable have
long been associated with a philosophical position known as nonreductive
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physicalism. Like emergence, nonreductive physicalism attempts to reconcile
physicalism with the idea that the special sciences are not reducible to physics.
The account I proposed here amounts to little more than a sketch. There are still
many important questions to be answered, and many of its aspects need to be
elaborated in more detail. The arguments I used here need to be improved and
expanded; many imperfections need to be ironed out; in one word, a lot of work
remains to be done. But the broad outlines I sketched here are, I think, essentially
correct.
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